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HENRY LEWIS ALLEN
Rank/Branch: O2/US Air Force
Unit: 56th Special Operations
Wing, Udorn AF TH (RAVENS)
Date of Birth: 21
September 1943
Home City of Record: Daytona
Beach FL
Date of Loss: 26 March
1970
Country of Loss: Laos
Loss Coordinates: 175900N
1023400E (TF543931)
Status (in 1973): Missing in
Action
Category:
4
Aircraft/Vehicle/Ground:
O1
Other Personnel in Incident:
Richard G. Elzinga (missing)
Refno: 1579
Source: Compiled by
Homecoming II Project 15 March 1990 with the assistance of one or more of the
following: raw data from U.S. Government agency sources, correspondence with
POW/MIA families, published sources, interviews. Updated
by the P.O.W. NETWORK.
REMARKS:
SYNOPSIS: The Steve Canyon program was a highly classified
FAC (forward air control) operation covering the military regions of Laos. U.S.
military operations in Laos were severely restricted during the Vietnam War era
because Laos had been declared neutral by the Geneva Accords.
The non-communist forces in Laos, however, had a critical
need for military support in order to defend territory used by Lao and North
Vietnamese communist forces. The U.S., in conjunction with non-communist forces
in Laos, devised a system whereby U.S. military personnel could be "in the
black" or "sheep-dipped" (clandestine; mustered out of the
military to perform military duties as a civilian) to operate in Laos under
supervision of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos. RAVEN was the radio call sign which
identified the flyers of the Steve Canyon Program. Men
recruited for the program were rated Air Force officers with at least six months
experience in Vietnam. They tended to be the very best of pilots, but by
definition, this meant that they were also mavericks, and considered a bit wild
by the mainstream military establishment.
The Ravens came under the formal command of CINCPAC and the
7/13th Air Force 56th Special Operations Wing at Nakhon Phanom, but their pay
records were maintained at Udorn with Detachment 1. Officially, they were on
loan to the U.S. Air Attache at Vientiane. Unofficially, they were sent to
outposts like Long Tieng, where their field commanders were the CIA, the Meo
Generals, and the U.S. Ambassador. Once on duty, they flew FAC missions which
controlled all U.S. air strikes over Laos.
All tactical strike aircraft had to be under the control of a FAC, who was
intimately familiar with the locale, the populous, and the tactical situation.
The FAC would find the target, order up U.S. fighter/bombers from an airborne
command and control center, mark the target accurately with white phosphorus
(Willy Pete) rockets, and control the operation throughout
the time the planes remained on station. After the fighters had departed, the
FAC stayed over the target to make a bomb damage assessment (BDA).
The FAC also had to ensure that there were no attacks on civilians, a
complex problem in a war where there were no front lines and any hamlet could
suddenly become part of the combat zone. A FAC needed a fighter pilot's
mentality, but but was obliged to fly slow and low in such unarmed and
vulnerable aircraft as the Cessna O1 Bird Dog, and the
Cessna O2. Consequently, aircraft used by the Ravens were continually peppered
with ground fire. A strong fabric tape was simply slapped over the bullet holes
until the aircraft could no longer fly. Ravens were hopelessly overworked by the
war. The need for secrecy kept their numbers low (never more than 22 at one
time), and the critical need of the Meo sometimes demanded each pilot fly 10 and
12 hour days. Some Ravens completed their tour of approximately 6 months with a
total of over 500 combat missions.
The Ravens in at Long Tieng in Military Region II, had, for
several years, the most difficult area in Laos. The base, just on the southern
edge of the Plain of Jars, was also the headquarters for the CIA-funded Meo army
commanded by General Vang Pao. An interesting account of this group can be read
in Christopher Robbins' book, "The Ravens". This book contains an
account of the loss of 1Lt. Henry L. Allen and Capt. Richard G. Elzinga:
The post at Long Tieng had been under seige, and it became
necessary for Ravens to live in Vietntiane in new quarters nicknamed Silver
City, but they continued to stage out of Long Tieng. "They called the daily
flight there and back...the 'commute.'
"Hank Allen, an exceptional pilot with eyes like a hawk,
took off with Dick Elzinga in the front seat of his O-1. Allen was 'short', soon
to return home after a tour in which he had notched up four hundred combat
missions, and he planned to return directly to the States and marry his fiancee
within a fortnight. Elzinga had only just arrived in Laos, and it was his first
trip up to the secret city. Allen intended to use the 'commute' as a checkout
ride. It was a cloudy day. He took off and reported over the radio...that the
O-1 was airborne. It was the last thing ever heard from them. Neither of the
pilots, nor the plane, was ever seen again.
"They had disappeared. Each of the Ravens spent at least two hours, on
top of their usual day's flying, searching for the wreckage. No Mayday call had
been heard, nor had a beeper signal been picked up from the survival radio, and
no clue to the airplane's whereabouts was discovered. The disappearance was a
complete mystery."
The official point of loss was noted as 20 miles northeast of
Vientiane, Laos. Both men were classified Missing in Action.
Three years later, on March 10, 1973, a Pathet Lao agent was captured
carrying three of Elzinga's traveler's checks and money of three countries.
Elzinga had not been in Vientiane long enough to get a locker for his billfold.
According to a 1974 list compiled by the National League of
POW/MIA Families, Elzinga, at least, survived the loss of the O1 plane.
Elzinga and Allen are among nearly 600 Americans lost in
Laos. Even though the Pathet Lao stated publicly that they held "tens of
tens" of American prisoners, not one American held in Laos was ever
released -- or negotiated for. Since U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War ended,
nearly 10,000 reports have been received by the U.S. Government relating to
Americans missing in Southeast Asia. Many authorities have reluctantly concluded
that hundreds are still alive in captivity today. We, as a nation, owe these men
our best effort to find them and bring them home. Until the fates of the men
like Elzinga and Allen are known, their families will
wonder if they are dead or alive ... and why they were abandoned.
**********
From - Mon Apr 10 13:05:06 2000
From: "Lee, Thomas E. - SAIC" <TLee@NSES.com>
Subject: Information correction
I am a retired US Air Force Colonel who served in Laos covertly
as part of DoD Project 404 from June 1968-June 1969. I was the
intelligence officer in Savannakhet operating in "civilian"
status working for the US Embassy. I carried civilian
documentation for presentation but also possessed my military ID
card. We wore civilian clothes. One of my roles was to support
the Raven forward air controllers (FAC), the US FACs operating
from "in-country" bases in Laos. See my website at
http://members.xoom.com/targeteer.
The following is a paragraph from the description of the "Raven"
Forward Air Controllers operating in Laos.
We lost 21 of them from 1966-1973.
"The non-communist forces in Laos, however, had a critical need
for military support in order to defend territory used by Lao
and North Vietnamese communist forces. The U.S., in conjunction
with non-communist forces in Laos, devised a system whereby
U.S. military personnel could be "in the black" or "sheep-
dipped" (clandestine; mustered out of the military to perform
military duties as a civilian) to operate in Laos under
supervision of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos."
****
An error in the above description is that most of the US
military personnel operating in Laos were NOT "sheep-dipped" as
you described. We were in the "Black" in that we were technically
not there, we were assigned to out of country units and our in-
country existence was generally classified for part of the 1964-
1973 period. (The existence of these operations was revealed
during Congressional Hearings in late 1969 or 1970). The Raven
Program and the complementary DoD Project 404 both began in 1966.
However, there was no mustering out of the service for the
Ravens or the Project 404 personnel. To my knowledge the only
program that was "sheep dipped" as you described was Project
Heavy Green (the Air Force troops supporting Site 85 and the
TACAN site support). That accounted for under 100 people. (13
were lost) There were military personnel operating within the
Air America and CIA (CAS) operations that may have operated
under different rules.
Critically speaking the US devised the sheep dipping process. It
was used across the US intelligence community. The non-communist
forces had virtually nothing to do with that process. They did
play a role in accepting the US military members in "civilian"
status by accepting our presence and not "spilling the beans".
We were not deceiving the opposition because they knew we were
military. Our deception was aimed at the World scene and the US
population regarding our activities in contravention of the 1962
Geneva Accords.
****
This was a very unique period and very misunderstood period in
our military history due to its classified nature. Fortunately,
we are able to tell our story now. Those of us that served in
Laos are trying to correct this mis-information and myth that
has grown up around these activities so they are better
understood in their real context.
Respectfully,
Tom Lee
(Thomas E. Lee, Colonel USAF (Ret))
Savannakhet, Laos
1968-1969
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